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1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are professors of law, business, economics,
and sports management. (A list of signatories is
included in the Appendix.) Their sole interest in this
case is to ensure that antitrust law develops in a way
that serves the public interest by promoting
competition. 1
Amici are numerous and diverse, differ in our
legal and political views, and disagree about some
details of this litigation. But we are united in our
agreement on three primary points. First,
Petitioners seek to unwind a century of antitrust law
by obtaining immunity for anticompetitive conduct.
Second, Petitioners mischaracterize numerous
rulings, most notably this Court’s opinion in NCAA
v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,
468 U.S. 85 (1984). And third, Petitioners aim to
overturn a hornbook Rule-of-Reason analysis by
which the lower courts corrected the NCAA’s own
failure to offer antitrust justifications.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT
1. Petitioners argue that Board of Regents
excused the NCAA from evidentiary obligations
strongly presumed to govern all matters under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. They claim this Court
gave the NCAA an antitrust immunity enjoyed by no
other entity in American law, a sui generis power to
No person other than amici curiae or their counsel authored
this brief in whole or in part or made a monetary contribution
intended to fund its preparation or submission. The parties
have filed blanket consents to the filing of amicus briefs.
1

2
decide that values other than price, quality, and
output can justify its trade restraints. And they
assert that this Court did all that despite its
insistence throughout antitrust history that
markets—not committees of competitors—decide
which products succeed and fail, and despite its own
deep hostility to scope limits and social-value
defenses.
2. Petitioners build that argument almost
entirely out of a few pages of dicta in Board of
Regents, presented in sometimes misleading ways.
They cite Board of Regents—a case the NCAA lost—
145 times on 61 pages, take dicta out of context,
selectively edit quotations, and disregard that
decision’s setting. They also misrepresent lower
court decisions and fail to report that one of them
draws the same line between procompetitive and
anticompetitive restraints as did the lower courts in
this case. At most, only one case in their purported
“judicial consensus” comes close to holding what
they say.
3. Petitioners recognize that if their proffered
immunity is rejected, they must defend their
restraint with actual evidence. But their evidentiary
demonstration fared poorly below, so they
mischaracterize the Rule of Reason and its
application in this case. We mostly ignore their
review of facts and remedial details, and we believe
this Court should too. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S.
at 98 n.15 (noting the “great weight” attached to
facts found by both lower courts); Brief for the
United States, Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, at 34
(view of President Reagan’s Solicitor General that

3
“there is no reason for this Court to overturn the
factual findings on which the two lower courts
agree”).
Instead, we argue the following: Petitioners’
failure at the first stage of the Rule of Reason was
substantial and undisputed. Plaintiffs demonstrated
“severe” anticompetitive effects, as “the challenged
restraints suppress competition and fix the price of
student-athletes’ services.” Pet. App. 139a. 2
Petitioners’ showing at the second stage was also
very weak. They largely rested on their definition of
“amateurism” without showing benefits to price,
quality, or output. The evidence they offered of
legally relevant gains was found by the courts to be
slim. Moreover, they succeeded at all only because
the courts worked to help them, looking for evidence
within their presentation on “amateurism” that
could be understood in legally cognizable terms of
consumer demand. It is thus ironic that they now
blame the courts for “judicial micromanagement,”
“central plann[ing],” and “endless litigation.” The
courts merely made an effort to find legally relevant
benefits within an otherwise weak evidentiary
showing.
Petitioners respond to that substantial showing
of net anticompetitive harm with logical critiques of
the lower courts’ handling of the second and third
stages. They claim that the courts should have
considered the NCAA’s justification as one package
rather than individual justifications, and that the
failure to do so led to a “least restrictive alternative”
2

Citations to “Pet. App.” are to the Appendix in No. 20-512.
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requirement. A review of the 897 Rule-of-Reason
cases in the modern era, however, finds no support
for this position in the caselaw. We also explain that
the “less restrictive alternative” formulation used
below was the most demanding standard imposed on
plaintiffs by any court in the past four decades. In
any event, Petitioners’ critiques of the lower courts’
analyses at the second and third stages are beside
the point. Even if plaintiffs had not shown a
competitively preferred alternative, the case would
have proceeded to the fourth stage—balancing—
and under the lopsided evidence of net competitive
injury below, the plaintiffs most likely would have
won.
Once the trial court appropriately found an
unreasonable restraint, it was faced with a choice of
remedy. It could either ban the conduct outright,
which would be even worse from Petitioners’
perspective, or enter some sort of conduct remedy. It
is no court’s fault that finding limits short of an
outright ban entails factual judgments linked to the
harm and benefits the parties could show.
Petitioners’ critique of the injunction’s details
effectively relitigates fact-finding that was, at worst,
a necessary evil to rectify their own conduct and
sparse evidentiary showing. The courts below were
clear that the NCAA can design its product any way
it likes, except that if it horizontally fixes the price
of an input—conduct that in other sectors could send
people to prison—it should respect certain limits,
and should expect to defend them from time to time
with evidence of legally relevant benefits.

5
4. Because Petitioners advance no other basis
for reversal, and the law was otherwise applied
properly below, we urge affirmance.
ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS WOULD
UNDERMINE
COMPETITION
AND
CONFLICT WITH ANTITRUST LAW

The substance of the new rule Petitioners ask
this Court to create would sharply conflict with
established antitrust policy. It would be a new
immunity or scope limitation of a kind this Court
has long opposed. It would also empower the NCAA,
alone among antitrust defendants, to choose values
of its own liking—not price, quality or output—and
use them to excuse conduct that would otherwise be
illegal. As a corollary, the NCAA would enjoy a
unique authority to preserve a product in a
particular form, even one at odds with consumer
preference expressed through free markets.
Relatedly, the NCAA would gain a special, favorable
antitrust treatment available to none of the
thousands of other desirable and important
economic integrations throughout the economy. Nor,
finally, do Petitioners gain any special advantage by
calling the NCAA a “joint venture.”
A. Petitioners’
Rule
Would
Limit
Antitrust Scope in a Way Deeply
Disfavored by This Court
Though they characterize it in various ways,
Petitioners seek what is effectively a new judicial
immunity. They mostly argue that it would not be
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unusual, 3 and briefly quibble that it is not
semantically an “immunity,” because plaintiffs
would still have the satisfaction of filing complaints
before the courts summarily dismiss them all. NCAA
Br. 30–31. But Petitioners claim that “amateurism
rules are procompetitive as a matter of law,” id. at
18, and that dismissal is required “on the pleadings”
as to any rule the NCAA calls “amateurism,” id. at
25, a categorization that is “not subject to judicial
second-guessing.” Conf. Br. 3; see also NCAA Br. 43
(courts are “required” to recognize “that the NCAA’s
conception of amateurism is procompetitive”). They
imagine a rule that would render some changing and
uncertain class of conduct categorically beyond
antitrust oversight.
If there is consensus in antitrust about any single
issue, it is that exemptions, immunities, and other
scope limitations are rarely justified. “Language
more comprehensive” than the antitrust statutes “is
difficult to conceive.” United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944). That
language captures Congress’s aim “to strike as
broadly as it could.” Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421
Petitioners imply different and inconsistent justifications for
their rule, and sometimes seem to acknowledge that it would
be special. Sometimes they emphasize the NCAA’s
uniqueness—they dwell on its special history and claim that
college sports are non-commercial, educational, and social.
Brief for Petitioner NCAA [NCAA Br.] 5–8, 31–33; Brief for
Petitioner Conferences [Conf. Br.] 4–5. But other times, they
claim their rule already applies in all business sectors. E.g.,
Conf. Br. 26 (“Board of Regents did not state a special rule for
the NCAA; it applied broad and generally applicable standards
of antitrust law”). These inconsistencies make no difference to
our arguments.
3
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U.S. 773, 787 (1975). More than a century of this
Court’s precedent has established that “[r]epeals of
[antitrust] by implication … are strongly disfavored”
because “antitrust … [is] a fundamental national
economic policy ….” Carnation Co. v. Pac.
Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 217–18 (1966). Even
where Congress makes exemptions, this Court reads
them narrowly. E.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v.
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982). These fundamental
tenets are shared by other antitrust institutions.
Every official study panel set up over many decades,
by Republican and Democratic Presidents and by
Congress, has called for the repeal or restriction of
antitrust scope limits. 4 And the enforcement
agencies, under control of either party, have agreed, 5
as has the leading professional organization. See
Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Antitrust Law, Federal
Statutory Exemptions From Antitrust Law 291–315
(2007).
Antitrust
Modernization
Comm’n,
Rep.
and
Recommendations 336–38 (2007); 1 Nat’l Comm’n for the
Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, Rep. to the President
and the Att’y Gen. 177–316 (1979); Rep. of the Task Force on
Productivity and Competition, reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec.
15933, 15934, 15937 (June 16, 1969); Rep. of the White House
Task Force on Antitrust Policy, reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec.
13890, 13897 (May 27, 1969); Rep. of the Att’y Gen.’s Comm. to
Study the Antitrust Laws 269 (1955).
4

5 E.g., Makan Delrahim, Asst. Att’y Gen., Examining
Exemptions and Immunities from the Antitrust Laws, Remarks
as Prepared for Antitrust Division’s First Competition and
Deregulation Roundtable (March 14, 2018); Christine A.
Varney, Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Immunities, Remarks as
Prepared for the American Antitrust Institute’s 11th Annual
Conference (June 24, 2010).
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B. Private Entities Do Not Get to Choose
Their
Own
Non-Competition
Antitrust Values
Petitioners’ rule also would allow the NCAA to
preserve values it considers important and use them
to justify trade restraints that would be illegal if
used by any other entity. Their “amateurism”
concept still has no determinate content, 6 and they
don’t often explain which values it contains or if
there are any limits on them. But Petitioners clearly
believe that the NCAA may promote objectives
based on morality, nostalgia, or other social policy
concerns, and sometimes they admit it explicitly—as
when they claim the NCAA enjoys antitrust
deference because it “serv[es] a societally important
non-commercial objective.” NCAA Br. 3. In fact,
Petitioners seek to save those values from
competition itself. Their major stated concern is that,
without horizontal restraints, competition among
schools for athletic talent would jeopardize values
they prefer but markets do not.
Antitrust entirely precludes these arguments.
Congress has already chosen the values that are
relevant to antitrust cases, and they are few,
All the courts in O’Bannon and this case so found, despite the
NCAA’s opportunity to explain the concept in two full trials
and two appeals. The district court in O’Bannon found the
definition “malleable,” lacking any “single definition,” and
frequently “revised[,] … sometimes in significant and
contradictory ways.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955,
1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014). And the district court here found it
lacking “coherent definition,” “circular,” and without any
consistency except that “the NCAA has decided to forbid
[something].” Pet. App. 83a, 92a, 142a.
6

9
narrowly delineated, and well known. If conduct
subject to antitrust law impedes quality-adjusted
price competition, then the only evidence that can
mitigate its illegality is an improvement in price,
quality, or output—as measured by an increase in
consumer demand. It is no defense that a restraint
serves some other social value or protects society
from ruinous competition. E.g., FTC v. Super. Ct.
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1990);
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463
(1986); Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940). Board of
Regents itself rejected such an argument. The NCAA
could not limit broadcast games to protect live
attendance on the “assumption that the product
itself is insufficiently attractive to consumers”
because that argument would be “inconsistent with
the basic policy of the Sherman Act.” 468 U.S. at 117;
see also id. at 101 n.23 (“good motives will not
validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice”).
Longstanding precedent of this Court thus
makes clear that “amateurism” is not a relevant
legal category, and it has no independent
significance in an antitrust case. It matters only to
the extent that it improves price, quality, or output.
As Chief Judge Thomas explained in his
O’Bannon concurrence, “amateurism is relevant
only insofar as popular demand for college sports is
increased by consumer perceptions of and desire for
amateurism.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049,
1082 (9th Cir. 2015) (Thomas, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
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And the district court in this case appropriately
explained that the restraints “cannot be deemed
procompetitive simply because they promote or are
consistent with amateurism,” but instead “must
have some procompetitive effect on the relevant
market.” Pet. App. 141a.
C. Markets,
Not
Committees
of
Competitors, Decide Which Products
Succeed
As a corollary, Petitioners raise no legally
relevant defense when they imply that particular
products have a moral or intrinsic right to exist in
their makers’ preferred form. On the one hand, firms
are free to sell whatever they like and design their
products as they think best, and in appropriate cases
they may design them collectively. But their
products must then succeed or fail on their merits,
by appealing to consumers in terms of price or
quality. No producer or association could argue that
it needs a trade restraint to preserve its product
because consumers in unrestrained markets would
have chosen something else.
For example, a given university might try to
compete for athletic talent by increasing
compensation. A rule prohibiting that competition
might be justified if the evidence showed that the
quality of the product, as measured by consumer
demand, would be harmed by loss of team parity or
consumer perception that such players are no longer
“students” or the like. In fact, the courts below took
that kind of evidence into account. But it is no
defense to argue, as Petitioners do in various ways,
that competition for talent should be suppressed

11
because member schools prefer their product to
remain an “amateur” product, or that its “amateur”
nature might not survive if competition for talent
gives some schools better or more popular teams.
Markets decide which products survive and,
accordingly, how they will be designed.
This same principle would apply to the
“definition” of any product, in sports or elsewhere.
Imagine that a group of manufacturers collectively
agrees not to purchase foreign-made inputs, or that
food distributors agree to discontinue products with
high-fructose corn syrup. If the firms take action to
enforce those decisions, and are shown to have
harmed quality-adjusted price competition, they
could not defend themselves by arguing that foreign
inputs are “un-American” or that high-sugar foods
are unhealthy. They could only argue that
consumers value products with domestic inputs or
healthier ingredients, as proven by evidence that
they would buy them at higher prices or in larger
quantities. Non-antitrust values might be important
and widely shared, but they are not legally relevant
until Congress adopts them by statute.
D. No Other Economic Integration Is
Treated as the NCAA Claims It Should
Be Treated
Petitioners’ proposed rule would give the NCAA
more favorable treatment than the thousands of
other economic integrations that face full Rule-ofReason scrutiny. For example, Petitioners rely on
the famous Broadcast Music decision, NCAA Br. 19
(citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)); Conf. Br. 28–29 (same),

12
but do not explain why the restraint there was
subject to the full Rule of Reason, 441 U.S. at 24.
That restraint made a stronger case for special
protection because the product—a group license for
musical compositions—literally could not exist
without agreement. See id. at 20–22. The NCAA, by
contrast, frequently changes its rules and tolerates
inter-conference variation, and so proves by its own
conduct that no particular restraints are required
for the product to exist.
The NCAA likewise deserves no better treatment
than professional sports leagues, which are much
more economically integrated. The NCAA
coordinates hundreds of disparate institutions
fielding thousands of teams in a variety of sports,
most of which will never face one another on the
field, and it permits extensive rules variations
among
the
sub-national
conferences
and
organizations. Professional leagues are more closely
integrated, typically consisting of a small number of
similar units subject to one set of rules and
frequently interacting. And yet this Court has held
professional leagues subject to ordinary Section 1
treatment, even for conduct as to which their
interests are aligned and collaboration could
generate benefits. American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560
U.S. 183, 203 (2010).
Nor are amateur sports more important or
special than the work of the economy’s thousands of
technological standard-setting organizations, as to
which full Rule of Reason is the norm. See Sean P.
Gates, Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust:
Integrating Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of
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Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 Emory L.J. 583,
627–30 (1998). Even though these entities’ sole
reason for being is to define products, this Court has
felt comfortable finding their conduct illegal without
special rules or deference. See, e.g., Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,
510–11 (1988); Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 577 (1982). And
while the groups now enjoy some special protections
in Section 1 cases, it is only because Congress
provided them by statute. See National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, § 2, 98
Stat. 1815, as amended, codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4301–06. Likewise, Petitioners could not
comfortably explain why amateur sports are more
special or important than the large variety of
important integrations that face full Rule-of-Reason
analysis under the ancillary restraints rule. 7
E. Calling the NCAA a “Joint Venture”
Adds
Nothing
to
Petitioners’
Argument
Petitioners do not strengthen their argument by
asserting that the NCAA is a “joint venture” or that
it cooperates in ways “required for a product to
See, e.g., Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d
1133, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc.,
36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994); Rothery Storage & Van Co.
v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Polk
Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th
Cir. 1985); see also Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v.
Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 338–39 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring); FTC & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.2 & Ex. 4
(2000).
7
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exist.” While courts have often been “bemused by the
label ‘joint venture,’” Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures
Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the
Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1007,
1045–46 (1969), this Court has frequently told them
not to be. Recently, for example, this Court
unanimously found a professional sports league to
be subject to ordinary Rule-of-Reason treatment
because “[t]he mere fact that [firms] operate jointly
in some sense does not mean that they are immune.”
American Needle, 560 U.S. at 199. After all,
“[m]embers of any cartel could insist that their
cooperation is necessary to produce the ‘cartel
product’ and compete with other products.” Id. at
199 n.7. Accordingly, “[a]n ongoing § 1 violation
cannot evade § 1 scrutiny simply by giving the
ongoing violation a name and label,” as “‘[p]erhaps
every agreement and combination in restraint of
trade could be so labeled.’” Id. at 197 (quoting
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593, 598 (1951)).
II.

BOARD OF REGENTS CREATES NO
SPECIAL RULE FAVORING THE NCAA

Not only is the substance of Petitioners’ position
contrary to the ordinary antitrust policy that applies
in other sectors, but Petitioners gain no support
from Board of Regents. That decision, which ruled
against the NCAA, discussed amateurism only in
dicta, and that discussion should be understood in
its historical setting. Misleading excerpts from the
ruling—or from lower court decisions—cannot fill
the gaps in Petitioners’ argument.
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A. Dicta and Context Reject Petitioners’
Radical Reinterpretation of Board of
Regents
Dicta. Board of Regents did not hold what
Petitioners claim it did. Petitioners argue that that
case “required” courts to recognize that “the NCAA’s
conception of amateurism is procompetitive.” NCAA
Br. 43 (emphasis added). They frequently reiterate
Board of Regents’ dicta that amateur players “must
not be paid,” see NCAA Br. 2, 3, 6, 11, 14, 16, 17, 22,
27, 34, 35, 38, 45, 46; Conf. Br. 1, 5, 9, 16, 23, 31,
even while acknowledging that they pay their
players “modest” amounts, NCAA Br. 7, 27, 29, 37,
46 n.4. And they say in various ways that this was a
“holding.” Conf. Br. 23 (claiming that Board of
Regents so “held”); see generally id. at 23–26; NCAA
Br. 28–29 (contending that Board of Regents dicta
“has full stare decisis effect”).
As Board of Regents itself explained, however,
this Court held “only that the record supports the
District Court’s conclusion that by curtailing output
and blunting the ability of member institutions to
respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has
restricted rather than enhanced the place of
intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.” 468
U.S. at 120. That statement mentions neither
amateurism nor evidentiary standards to be used in
cases not before the Court. The brief discussion of
amateurism, which Petitioners frequently cite,
resolved no disputed matters of law and was subject
to no fact findings in the trial record. See id. at 100–
01 (clarifying that no part of this Court’s “decision
[was] based … on [its] respect for the NCAA’s
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historic role in the preservation and encouragement
of intercollegiate amateur athletics”). Remarkably,
the NCAA did not even argue in Board of Regents
that “amateurism” justified its restraints, and its
counsel admitted during oral argument that it
“might be able to get more viewers … if it had semiprofessional clubs rather than amateur clubs.”
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (quoting Oral Arg.
Tr. at 25, Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85).
Context. The context of Board of Regents casts
further doubt on Petitioners’ interpretation.
Foreclosing judicial inquiry into uncertain facts
would be quite at odds with the antitrust
jurisprudence of the 1970s and 1980s. At that time,
this Court was in the midst of a long season of repeal
of per se antitrust rules, stressing the need for
empirical caution. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–59 (1977).
In fact, the questions at issue in Board of Regents
were poorly suited for conclusory, categorical
treatment. For years, sports economists had been
bitterly divided over empirical claims that trade
restraints improve team parity or consumer appeal.
Compare Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, American Needle, 560 U.S.
183, with Amicus Curiae Brief of Economists in
Support of Petitioner, American Needle, 560 U.S.
183. Since then, the empirical literature has grown
against those claims. 8 It would be uncanny for a
See, e.g., Rodney Fort & Jason Winfree, 15 Sports Myths and
Why They’re Wrong 7–110 (2013); Thomas A. Baker III, Marc
Edelman, & Nicholas M. Watanabe, Debunking the NCAA’s
Myth that Amateurism Conforms with Antitrust Law: A Legal
8
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Court devoted to greater caution and empirical
fullness to rule a priori on empirical matters that
were sharply contested then and have grown more
doubtful since.
B. Petitioners’ Discussion of Board of
Regents Is Misleading
Petitioners exaggerate and misinterpret Board of
Regents. First, they misstate what Board of Regents
held as to the television broadcast restraints that
were actually at issue, claiming they were “subject
to detailed rule-of-reason analysis.” NCAA Br. 8, 23.
Not only did Board of Regents not subject those
restraints to the full Rule of Reason, but its holding
that they enjoyed little deference at all is a leading
application of the pro-plaintiff quick-look Rule of
Reason. We know it was a quick-look case because
the Court explicitly held that the television contract
could be found illegal without any proof of market
power. 468 U.S. at 109–10; see also Cal. Dental Ass’n
v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999) (describing
application of quick look in Board of Regents as what
this Court “held”).
This misreading seems important to Petitioners’
position. They imply that if the NCAA enjoys fullRule-of-Reason treatment for even the grossest
horizontal price and output restraints, then perhaps
rules like the scholarship restraints in this case
enjoy more deferential treatment. But on the
and Statistical Analysis, 85 Tenn. L. Rev. 661, 698 (2018)
(empirical study found “no change in consumption of [D1
Football Bowl Subdivision] Power Five football games
following the first significant increase in student-athlete
compensation in more than forty-two years”).
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contrary, the NCAA’s restraints in Board of Regents
were held nearly per se illegal because they were so
obviously harmful.
Similarly, in a revealing moment, Petitioners
conceal an important distinction that the Court was
at pains to explain and that the Board of Regents
dicta was about. Petitioners quote from Board of
Regents that “the NCAA and its member institutions
market … competition itself” and that “this would be
completely ineffective if there were no rules on
which the competitors agreed to create and define
the competition to be marketed.” NCAA Br. 22
(quoting 468 U.S. at 101). But they then make a
misleading edit, quoting this Court that “[a] myriad
of rules … all must be agreed upon.” Id. (ellipses in
Petitioner’s Brief). The Court actually wrote that the
“myriad” includes “rules affecting such matters as
the size of the field, the number of players on a team,
and the extent to which physical violence is to be
encouraged or proscribed.” Board of Regents, 468
U.S. at 101 (emphasis added). Those restraints—
rules of on-field play on which schools must agree—
are far different than the price restrictions at issue
in this case. See, e.g., American Needle, 560 U.S. at
196–97 (stating that “contracts with … playing
personnel” are an issue on which NFL teams
“compete with one another”).
C. The
Lower
Court
Explicitly
Rejects
Position

“Consensus”
Petitioners’

The “consensus” of courts that Petitioners claim
has read Board of Regents differently, NCAA Br. 9,
is, at most, just one case. Petitioners’ other cited
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cases are inapposite, and one of the key decisions on
which they rely tells us that they are not on point.
In fact—remarkably—that decision drew exactly the
same distinction between procompetitive and
anticompetitive restraints that the lower courts did
in this case.
Namely, Agnew v. NCAA, a case the NCAA won
only because the plaintiff pled no relevant market at
all, distinguished between NCAA rules governing
“financial aid” and a category it described as
“eligibility rules.” 683 F.3d 328, 345–47 (7th Cir.
2012). The court borrowed from Board of Regents to
make that distinction, id. at 339 (quoting 468 U.S.
at 117), and to illustrate “eligibility,” it offered the
example of “rules requiring class attendance,” id. at
343. “[F]inancial aid rules,” on the other hand,
including the scholarship limits in that case,
deserved no “procompetitive presumption.” Id. at
344. The court thought any such claim would be “far
too great a leap to make without evidentiary proof at
the full Rule of Reason stage.” Id. In other words,
Agnew thought “eligibility” rules are those that
require players actually to be students, and it
explicitly distinguished those rules from educationrelated compensation. That is the same distinction
drawn by the courts below.
Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2018), just
confirmed the state of Seventh Circuit law, relying
mainly on Agnew to hold that a residency
requirement—involving no price or output restraint,
and merely ensuring a person is a student at the
school where they want to play—is an “eligibility”
rule that enjoys favorable treatment. Id. at 502.
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Thus, the Seventh Circuit has all but explicitly held
that NCAA limits on education-related payments
must face full Rule-of-Reason review. The law of the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits is the same.
Petitioners cite two other inapt cases. Smith v.
NCAA involved a non-monetary eligibility rule very
similar to that in Deppe. 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
Likewise, in upholding tire specifications chosen to
make car races more exciting—the equivalent of
specifications for football players’ shoes or helmets—
Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire
Corp. involved no horizontal restraints at all, much
less horizontal price restraints. 614 F.3d 57 (3d Cir.
2010).
That leaves only McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d
1338 (5th Cir. 1988), which dismissed a challenge to
financial benefits restrictions. But even that case did
not find categorical immunity of the kind Petitioners
claim, as it considered whether the plaintiff
adequately alleged that the restraints would “stifle
competition.” Id. at 1345. To whatever extent
McCormack found a special rule in Board of Regents
for price and output restraints, it is wrong, and it is
alone. It would conflict with both the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits, and is incorrect for the reasons amici
have explained.
III. THE COURTS BELOW FOUND A
HORNBOOK VIOLATION OF ANTITRUST
LAW
The district court in this case, affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit, applied hornbook antitrust law. The
courts’ version of the Rule of Reason was deferential
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to defendants, and the courts worked to help the
defendants make their case by filling in weaknesses
in the NCAA’s evidence. The courts found “severe”
injury at the first stage of the analysis, a finding that
remains undisputed, offset only modestly by
procompetitive benefits that the lower courts found
within the NCAA’s non-antitrust justifications.
Given a finding of substantial net injury, the
conclusion that the limited benefits could have been
obtained without so much competitive damage
naturally followed.
Petitioners now respond with abstract logical
critiques of the district court’s handling of Rule-ofReason steps two and three. Their arguments are
incorrect, especially given the very high bar the
courts required plaintiffs to meet at the third stage.
In any event, they find no support in the caselaw,
and even if they were correct, there would have
followed a balancing stage at which the defendants
likely would have lost.
A. Plaintiffs Demonstrated
Anticompetitive Effects

“Severe”

The plaintiffs in this case demonstrated a
particularly strong case under the Rule of Reason.
Of the 897 Rule-of-Reason cases decided in the
modern era, courts have disposed of nearly all at the
initial stage on the grounds that the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect. 9
Since 1977, courts decided 90% (809 of 897) on this ground,
with the figure rising to 97% (391 of 402) after 1999. Michael
A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the
21st Century, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827 (2009) (reviewing
cases between 1999 and 2009); Michael A. Carrier, The Real
9
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This case was very different. The plaintiffs
demonstrated “severe” anticompetitive effects in the
form of an “exercise [of] monopsony power” that
“essentially eliminate[d] price competition ….” Pet.
App. 139a, 162a. Because “elite student-athletes
lack any viable alternatives to [Division 1],” they
must “accept … whatever compensation is offered to
them,” regardless of “whether any such
compensation is an accurate reflection of the
competitive value of their athletic services.” Pet.
App. 34a; see also Pet. App. 78a (noting harm from
“artificially compressing and capping studentathlete compensation and reducing competition for
student-athlete
recruits
by
limiting
the
compensation offered in exchange for their athletic
services”).
Nor are these severe harms to the players
hypothetical. As Judge Milan Smith noted in his
concurrence below, “Student-Athletes work an
average of 35–40 hours per week on athletic duties
during their months-long athletic seasons,” are
“often forced to miss class, to neglect their studies,
and to forego courses,” and are “often prevented from
obtaining internships or part-time paying jobs,”
while “the NCAA and Division 1 universities make
billions of dollars from ticket sales, television
contracts, merchandise, and other fruits that
directly flow from the labors of Student-Athletes.”
Pet. App. 53a–54a (Smith, J., concurring) (emphasis
in original); see also Tony Paul, UM’s Fab Five
Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
1265 (reviewing cases from Continental T.V., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) to 1999). The drafters reviewed every Rule-of-Reason
case between 2009 and February 2021 for this brief.
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Players Want to Break Down Barriers, The Detroit
News, Oct. 8, 2016 (at the same time Michigan
signed a deal with Nike in the early 1990s worth
$170 million, members of the “Fab Five” basketball
team had to pool their money so they could afford
Taco Bell).
B. The Courts Below Gave the NCAA the
Benefit of the Doubt on Its Purported
Procompetitive Justifications
After the plaintiffs’ demonstration at stage one,
the burden shifted to the defendant to demonstrate
a procompetitive justification. The NCAA, however,
offered little related to any antitrust justification,
instead relying on its own definition of
“amateurism.” Petitioners complain that the courts
below didn’t understand or didn’t apply that
definition properly—even though the district court
applied the same definition as the NCAA’s own
expert, Pet. App. 40a n.16—but it doesn’t matter.
When called to provide legally relevant evidence, the
defendants “offered no cogent explanation for why
limits or prohibitions on these education-related
benefits are necessary to preserve consumer
demand,” Pet. App. 148a, and their expert “did not
even attempt to examine whether a relationship
exists between [athlete] compensation and
consumer demand,” Pet. App. 144a. In affirming
those findings, the Ninth Circuit noted that “the
NCAA set limits on education-related benefits
without consulting any demand studies.” Pet. App.
36a.
By contrast, the district court relied on legally
relevant evidence. It considered “demand analyses,
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survey evidence, and NCAA testimony indicating
that caps on non-cash, education-related benefits
have no demand-preserving effect and, therefore,
lack a procompetitive justification.” Pet. App. 36a. It
reviewed defendants’ evidence carefully, searching
for legally relevant benefits and finding that “some
of the challenged rules serve [the NCAA’s]
procompetitive purpose: limits on above-COA [costof-attendance] payments unrelated to education, the
COA cap on athletic scholarships, and certain
restrictions on cash academic or graduation awards
and incentives.” Pet. App. 35a (emphasis omitted).
The court found no benefit in “restricting ‘non-cash
education-related benefits,’” however, because those
“benefits, like a scholarship for post-eligibility
graduate school tuition, [are] inherently limited to
[their] actual value, and could not be confused with
a professional athlete’s salary.” Pet. App. 35a. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed this distinction, holding that
the district court “fairly found that NCAA
compensation limits preserve demand to the extent
they prevent unlimited cash payments akin to
professional salaries, but not insofar as they restrict
certain education-related benefits.” Pet. App. 40a.
C. Petitioners’ Attacks on Steps Two and
Three Are Incorrect and Would Make
No Difference
Considering Harms and Benefits “As a Whole.”
Petitioners contend that the NCAA’s evidence of
procompetitive benefits would have been better
received if the district court had “review[ed] at step
2 whether [the] rules as a whole produced the
procompetitive benefits of offering a distinctive
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product,” implying that it was unfair to have
considered the harms of “the NCAA rules as a whole
…..” NCAA Br. 39 (emphasis and quotations
omitted); see Conf. Br. 35. They argue that doing so
had the effect of converting a “less” restrictive
alternative test into a “least” restrictive one. NCAA
Br. 41; Conf. Br. 37 (“the effect of the lower courts’
approach was to impose upon them the insuperable
burden of having to prove a negative: the absence of
a less restrictive alternative”) (emphasis in original).
Apparently as a variation on the same argument,
Petitioners claim that they effectively bore the
burden at stage three. Conf. Br. 39. They then
contend that the district court would have avoided
these problems by following a “reasonable necessity”
test instead of one based on less restrictive
alternatives. NCAA Br. 41–42; Conf. Br. 40.
Petitioners’ argument finds no support in the
caselaw and misapprehends the burden-shifting
Rule of Reason. The argument is irrelevant at stage
two, where courts do not inquire into the size or
nature of the benefits shown, or compare them to the
harm. At stage two, courts merely ask whether
defendants have produced some indication of
benefits to competition. If so, the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff. Likewise, the purpose of stage three
is not to compare the benefits to demonstrated harm,
but only to ask whether they could be obtained with
much less harm.
Petitioners argue that stage three subjected
them to a “least” restrictive alternative analysis
because the courts below didn’t group their
justifications together. But the courts could not and
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should not have lumped Petitioners’ claims into one
justification. Whether or not the courts considered
the harms separately or as a whole makes no
difference because they found that each restraint
has “severe” anticompetitive effects. Each of them
“artificially compress[es] and cap[s] student-athlete
compensation.” Pet. App. 78a, 82a. And each
prevents the compensation from “accurate[ly]
reflect[ing] … the competitive value of … athletic
services.” Pet. App. 82a.
In contrast, some of Petitioners’ justifications
were supported by no evidence of consumer benefit
at all, as they failed to show a connection between
particular restraints and consumer demand.
Petitioners seem to argue that the courts were
required to credit those alleged benefits as part of a
package because the harms were considered
together. But if some proffered justifications are
legally irrelevant, then courts should not be
compelled to accept them. 10
Nor can Petitioners find support in the caselaw
for their argument. Having reviewed all 897 Rule-ofReason cases in the modern era, we were unable to
locate a single one in which a court examined the

Petitioners also misread the leading treatise on this point.
The discussion there of “the content of the restraint,” which
includes “the sum total of everything that the parties have
‘agreed’ about,” refers not to multiple rules but to the
“enlarge[ment] or interpret[ation of] those documents by [the
defendant’s] conduct.” 7 Philip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles
and Their Application ¶ 1504d, p. 421 (4th ed. 2017) (“Areeda
& Hovenkamp”) (italics omitted).
10
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defendant’s array of justifications in a bundle
similar to what the NCAA is seeking.
Importance of third stage. Having found severe
anticompetitive harm and (as reformulated in terms
of consumer demand) some benefit, the district court
moved to step three. This stage of the analysis is
important: If a less restrictive alternative would
attain the defendant’s objectives nearly—or
completely—as
effectively
while
harming
competition significantly less, then we can achieve
the defendant’s objectives with less competitive
harm. Moreover, where a plaintiff demonstrates
that the benefits did not require such significant
competitive harms, courts can avoid the challenge of
balancing harms and benefits. Areeda &
Hovenkamp ¶ 1507d, p. 450. The third stage also
avoids the “extreme” position of “tolerat[ing] every
restraint whenever the defendant states a plausible
connection with a legitimate objective and claims
that the alternatives are unsatisfactory.” Id.
¶ 1505b, p. 436.
Highest bar for less restrictive alternatives. The
lower courts’ approach at this third stage was not
only appropriate, but also highly favorable to
Petitioners. First, the courts below, relying on
O’Bannon, applied the most demanding version of
the analysis that courts have applied in the past four
decades. It credited only alternatives when the
restraint was “patently and inexplicably stricter
than … necessary” and the alternative did not
impose “‘significantly increased cost.’” Pet. App. 41a
(quoting O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074–75 (emphasis
omitted)). This is an extremely high bar that
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requires a plaintiff to show that a restraint is clearly
and without explanation more restrictive than
needed. Such an analysis would only credit an
alternative when the restraint is obviously
disconnected from the defendant’s justifications.
Because it is so difficult to satisfy, it avoids judicial
“tinker[ing]” to find marginally less restrictive
alternatives, and in fact closely resembles the
“reasonable necessity” standard that Petitioners
prefer. See NCAA Br. 41; Conf. Br. 47, 49. A
restraint that is clearly and inexplicably
disconnected from the objective is not reasonably
necessary to attain it. See Carrier, Real Rule of
Reason, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1341–46.
Second, the courts connected the alternative with
the defendant’s objectives. A concern at the third
stage is that courts might focus only on the existence
of less restrictive alternatives, not on whether the
alternative attains the defendant’s objectives. That
did not happen here. Again, the courts worked to
shape the NCAA’s focus on amateurism into a
justification cognizable under the antitrust laws.
This significant effort to rework the NCAA’s
justifications made it much more likely that the
courts would—as they in fact did—consider whether
the proffered alternatives would attain the goal of
consumer demand, ensuring that they directly
considered the link between alternatives and
objectives.
Courts’
applications
of
less
restrictive
alternatives. The district court accepted an
alternative that would
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“(1) allow the NCAA to continue to limit
grants-in-aid at not less than the
[COA]; (2) allow the [NCAA] to
continue to limit compensation and
benefits unrelated to education; [and]
(3) enjoin NCAA limits on most
compensation and benefits that are
related to education, but allow it to
limit education-related academic or
graduation awards and incentives, as
long as the limits are not lower than its
limits on athletic performance awards
now or in the future.” Pet. App. 118a.
This result is appropriate. It gives the NCAA the
benefit of the doubt when there is any chance that
the restrictions could possibly affect consumer
demand.
And
it
precisely
matches
the
procompetitive justifications the courts accepted.
On the other hand, the district court “reasonably
concluded that uncapping certain education-related
benefits would preserve consumer demand for
college athletics just as well as the challenged rules
do.” Pet. App. 41a. It is difficult to see how
restrictions on education-related benefits like
computers, science equipment, musical instruments,
and tutoring make it more likely that consumers
would watch college sports. In fact, if the NCAA
actually sought to foster consumer demand, then
“market competition in connection with educationrelated benefits” would itself “reinforce consumers’
perception of student-athletes as students.” Pet.
App. 43a. Restrictions like these do not make
student-athletes appear less like professionals or
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enhance consumer demand, and are more likely
explained as a cartel’s cost-saving measure, which
courts do not accept. Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 1508,
p. 461.
D. Even in the Absence of a Less
Restrictive Alternative, Plaintiffs
Would Have Won at Balancing
In any event, none of Petitioners’ attacks on the
second- and third-stage analyses are ultimately
relevant because even if plaintiffs had not shown a
less restrictive alternative, this case would have
gone to balancing. And at that stage, given “severe”
anticompetitive effects and the NCAA’s failure to
consider effects on consumer demand, defendants
likely would have lost.
All the sources relied on for this Court’s recent
formulation of the Rule-of-Reason test in Ohio v.
American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018),
required a balancing stage, 11 and the dissent in that
case plainly contemplated one. See id. at 2291
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the plaintiff
could win at the third stage “by showing that the
legitimate objective does not outweigh the harm that
competition will suffer, i.e., that the agreement ‘on
See Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33
Antitrust 50, 53 (2019) (analyzing Capital Imaging Assocs. v.
Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.
1993); 1 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade
Regulation § 12.02[1] (2d ed. 2017); and most notably Areeda
& Hovenkamp ¶ 1502, pp. 398–99 (explaining that if a plaintiff
cannot show a less restrictive alternative, “the harms and
benefits must be compared to reach a net judgment whether
the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable”)).
11
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balance’ remains unreasonable”). The leading
treatise also contemplates balancing because, even
if it is sometimes difficult or problematic, some
opportunity for balancing is essential. Areeda &
Hovenkamp ¶ 1507a, p. 442; see also, e.g., Pet. App.
162a (“If no balancing were required at any point in
the analysis, an egregious restraint with a minor
procompetitive effect would have to be allowed to
continue, merely because a qualifying less
restrictive alternative was not shown.”); Carrier,
The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 Antitrust at 53–
54. Other than conduct deemed per se illegal,
antitrust doctrine requires courts to consider
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects, and it is
hard to see how a court can make this assessment
without, at some point, having the chance to directly
compare the two. In the context of this case, a
balancing analysis likely would have led to the
NCAA coming up short.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, this Court should affirm
the decision of the court below.
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